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I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that the European Community's (EC) legal
framework provides only incomplete protection of human rights. This state
of affairs arose from the origin and nature of the EC itself: the founding
treaties forged an economic union while simultaneously preserving national
sovereignty over social and political matters. Hence, the paradox that while
all the member states of the European Union (EU) are parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(HRFF),1 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently held that there is
no community competence under article 235 (or any other article) of the
Treaty on European Union to accede to the HRFF.2
This paper examines the impact of the court's opinion on the development
of human rights protection within the EU by setting it in various contexts,
particularly the ongoing scholarly debate on accession to the HRFF, the
jurisprudence of the ECJ, and the changes to be effected by the Amsterdam
Treaty.'
J.D. 1998, University of Georgia School of Law.
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter HRFF].
2 See Opinion 2/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1996 E.C.R. I-
1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996) [hereinafter Opinion 2/94]; TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992) [hereinafter TEU].
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter AMSTERDAM TREATY].
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The combined effect of Opinion 2/94 and the Amsterdam Treaty, which
formally recognizes the jurisdiction of the ECJ over fundamental rights, is to
reinforce the status quo. In other words, it is left to the ECJ to develop human
rights protection on a case by case basis. Furthermore, while the supporters
of accession were formerly in the majority, it may be argued that the court's
opinion and the provisions of the new treaty reflect an emerging consensus
eschewing accession to the HRFF and favoring expansion of community
competence and the court's jurisdiction over fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, as the competence of the EC over social and political matters
expands in the wake of the monetary union and the gaps in the protection of
human rights in the EC become more glaring, the pressure to amend the treaty
to provide clear and full protection of fundamental rights will prove irresist-
ible. It remains to be seen whether the treaty will be amended to allow
accession to the HRFF or to provide a catalogue of rights.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 26, 1995, 4 the Council of the European Union requested the
opinion of the court on the question of whether the accession of the EC to the
HRFF5 would be compatible with the Treaty Establishing the European
Community. 6 The council had not yet formally decided to open accession
negotiations.7
On November 7, 1995, the ECJ heard the oral arguments of the govern-
ments of the member states.8 Ireland and the United Kingdom argued that the
request for an opinion was not admissible. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden
questioned whether the request was prematurely made. The Commission,
Parliament, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal took the position
See Judith Hippler Bello et al., International Decision: Opinion 2/94, Accession of the
Community to the European Conventionfor the Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 664, 664 (1996).
' See HRFF, supra note 1, at 274-81.
6 As amended in Title 11, art. G(1)-(86) of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1, art. 6(1)-(86) (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
7 Bello et al., supra note 4, at 664.
8 For summaries of the positions taken by the governments of the member states, see
Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1- 1759, 1769-76.
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that the request was admissible in that it concerned an agreement coming
under article 228(6) of the EC Treaty.9
The Commission, Parliament, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Sweden, and Austria argued that in the absence of an express
provision, article 235 of the EC Treaty was the legal basis for accession."
Austria, in fact, argued that the EC had external competence to accede to the
HRFF arising or implied from its horizontal internal application of the rights
guaranteed by the convention." All of the governments arguing for a legal
basis for accession submitted that external judicial control was necessary to
protect individuals against action by community institutions not in accord with
the HRFF.'2
Spain, France, Portugal, Ireland, and the United Kingdom argued that the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) does not allocate specific power to the EC
in the area of human rights. 3 Consequently, they argued that there is no legal
basis for accession and that article 235 does not apply because respect for
human rights is not listed as an EC objective in articles 2 and 3 of the EC
Treaty. 4
The arguments of all the member states acknowledged the difficulties
presented by the incompatibility of accession with articles 164 and 219 of the
EC Treaty, which deal with the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Those states in favor
of accession assumed that submitting to external control in the field of human
rights would not fundamentally affect the autonomy of the community legal
order. Those states opposing accession argued that as a result of accession the
ECJ would surrender its ultimate authority as interpreter of community law,
at least within the scope of the application of the HRFF.
9 See id. at 275. EC TREATY, art. 228(6) provides: "The Council, the Commission or a
Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement
envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty."
'0 See id. at 277. EC TREATY, art. 235 provides: "If action by the Community should
prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament, take the appropriate measures."
" See generally Bello et al., supra note 4, at 665 (explaining the court's finding that the
competence of the EC to enter into international commitments may be express or implied).
2 See Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1774.
'3 See id. at 1775.
14 See id.
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On March 28, 1996, the ECJ delivered its opinion.' 5 The court held, first,
that the council's request for an opinion was admissible, finding that it was
prompted by the council's legitimate concern to know the exact extent of its
powers before deciding whether or not to open negotiations. 16 Secondly, the
court held that it lacked sufficient information to determine whether accession
would be compatible with the EC Treaty, particularly articles 164 and 219
dealing with the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Specifically, the court indicated that
it needed information regarding the mechanisms for submitting questions
arising under the HRFF to thejudicial control of the European Court of Human
Rights.' 7 Finally, the ECJ held that there were neither express nor implied
powers under the EC Treaty for the EC to conclude international agreements
on human rights nor was accession to the HRFF within the scope of article
235.18 Rather, the court held that expanding the system of protection for
human rights within the EC would be of constitutional significance and could
only be achieved by amendment of the treaty.' 9
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Terms of the Debate
The court's opinion must be viewed not only in the context of the ongoing
scholarly and political debate on how to fill gaps in the protection of human
rights within the EC, but also in light of the relevant provisions of the
Amsterdam Treaty. Prior to the changes wrought by the Amsterdam Treaty,
EC policy on human rights was developed primarily in articles of the TEU that
did not come under the jurisdiction of the ECJ.20 A certain tension arose
between the creation of citizenship in the EU (article 8) and the lack of a "Bill
of Rights" protecting that citizenship.2' Furthermore, the absence of a
'5 See No EU Competence to Sign Up to Human Rights Convention, European Information
Service, European Report No. 2120, Mar. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ECLAW File.
16 See Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1785.
17 See id. at 1786.
'8 See id. at 1788-89. The Commission, Parliament, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden argued that the three criteria of article 235 were met: the
protection of human rights is an objective of the EC; accession is necessary to pursue that
objective; and a link exists between accession and the functioning of the internal market. See
id. at 1773.
'9 See id. at 1789.
20 See TEU, supra note 2, art. K.
2" See id. art. G(c) (inserting a new article 8 on citizenship).
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community mechanism for enforcing the rights of citizens of the EU had
caused several member states, Germany and Italy in particular, to express their
uneasiness at adhering to the TEU without reservation.22
There had been general consensus among scholars and in the EC that such
a gap must be filled either by amending the treaty to include a catalogue of
human rights or by acceding to the HRFF. Formerly, the more popular
proposal for repairing the holes in the human rights safety net called for EC
accession to the HRFF. 3 In the wake of the recent ECJ opinion, however, the
terms of the debate necessarily shifted. Once the court declared that there was
no legal basis for EC accession, those who advocated reform turned their
attention toward how to amend the treaty, i.e., whether to amend the treaty to
provide a legal basis for accession or to amend the treaty to include a catalogue
of rights. The European Commission called for consideration of ways to
improvejudicial control of EU institutions' respect for fundamental rights and
set forth the options open to the member states. The Commission's position
was clearly antagonistic to the highly popular position calling for amendment
to allow accession to the HRFF.24 The Commission pointed out that accession
would involve amending the treaty to incorporate the rights protected under
the HRFF and would subject fundamental rights to the external judicial control
of the European Court of Human Rights.25 The Commission noted three
alternatives to accession: 1) maintaining the status quo (i.e., with the ECJ
overseeing respect for fundamental rights in the absence of any express treaty
authority to do so); 2) bringing the respect for fundamental rights referred to
in article F(2) within the jurisdiction of the ECJ by amending article L; or 3)
extending the scope for bringing actions before the ECJ by enabling individu-
als to bring actions directly for violations of fundamental rights.26
22 See generally id., Protocal on Social Policy and accompanying Agreement, at O.J. (C
191) 90-93 (1992).
23 This explains the council's request for the Opinion of the Court of Justice. See Opinion
2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1763-65. The commission has long advocated accession.
Commission Memorandum on the Accession of the European Communities to the HRFF, 1979
E.C. BULL., Supp. 2/79. In addition, the European Parliament, although favoring an amendment
to the treaty, also issued statements in favor of accession. Parliament Resolution on Community
Accession to the HRFF, 1994 O.J. (C 44) 32.
24 Annexes to the Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL, no.6, at 44 (1996) (I. 67, 68).
2 See id.
26 See id. at 1.68.
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B. The Amsterdam Treaty
The drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty chose to amend the EU Treaty by
bringing the protection of fundamental rights within the jurisdiction of the
ECJ.27 As will be discussed below, this amendment obviates certain criticisms
of union protection of fundamental rights but, in effect, does little to change
the status quo other than formally approving the framework of human rights
protection already developed in the case law of the ECJ.28 Some gaps in the
protection of fundamental rights remain. Indeed, during the drafting process
Parliament was critical of the position that would eventually be adopted in the
Amsterdam Treaty. The Parliament cited the absence of provisions for
accession to the HRFF and of provisions for a direct access by individuals to
the ECJ in the event of fundamental rights violations by EC institutions as
evidence of a general "lack of ambition on the part of certain Member States
to carry out genuine far-reaching reforms."29
The Amsterdam Treaty does, however, add enforcement provisions. When
the council has determined that a member state is in violation of the principles
set forth in article 6(1) ("liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law"), the council by qualified majority
vote may suspend voting and other rights of the member state. 30 The new
treaty positively encourages prospective members to meet the standard of
human rights protection set by the HRFF and the common constitutional
traditions of the EU by making respect for article 6(1) principles a precondi-
tion for admission.3 The rest of this section will outline the development and
current extent of human rights protection within the EC and highlight issues
that require further consideration in future amendment processes.
27 See AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 3, art. 46(d) (amending TEU, art. L).
28 TEU, art. F(2) had already drawn verbatim on the formulation used by the ECJ in a long
line of cases developing fundamental rights. See Jo Shaw, Twin-Track Social Europe-the
Inside Track, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 295,301 (David O'Keefe & Patrick
M. Twomey eds., 1994) (citing Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R.
2859, [1991] 1 C.E.C. 280).
29 European Parliament Resolution on the General Outline for a Draft Revision of the
Treaties, 1997 O.J. (C 33) 66, 67.
30 AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 3, art. 7(1 )-(2).
"' See id. art. 49.
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C. External Sources of Human Rights Protection
It remains the case that much of the protection for human rights of
individual citizens of the EU emanates from outside the EC, namely from the
HRFF, the single most important instrument for protecting human rights in
Europe.32 The HRFF guarantees the right to life (article 2); the right to liberty
and security (article 5); the freedom from degradation and slavery (article 4);
the right to a fair trial (article 6); and the freedom of expression (article 10)."
In addition, the First Protocol to the HRFF, which went into effect May 18,
1954, provided for the protection of personal property.34 The preamble of the
HRFF states as its primary objectives the "collective enforcement,"
"maintenance," and "further realization" of "Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms."3 The HRFF constitutes two organs. to supervise observance: the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. All of the EC member states have ratified the HRFF, although some
have expressed reservations. The ECJ recognizes the convention as establish-
ing a supranational legal order against which the compatibility of national
legislation may be gauged.36 In its turn, the Maastricht Treaty used the
language of the court to incorporate the HRFF as the standard for fundamental
rights within the EU.37 The Amsterdam Treaty formally places the protection
of fundamental rights, as incorporated by reference to the HRFF and the
common constitutional traditions of the member states, within the jurisdiction
of the ECJ.38
Nevertheless, acts within the competence of the EC are inadmissible before
the European Court of Human Rights because they are not acts of member
states within the meaning of article 1 of the HRFF.39 Furthermore, the very
existence of two parallel systems applying human rights standards tends to set
32 See PETER WESSMAN, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 2-3 (1992).
33 HRFF, supra note 1, at 221-30.
34 First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 1.
31 HRFF, supra note 1, preamble.
36 See Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1229, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 140 (1976).
37 See TEU, supra note 2, art. F ("The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms... and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
as general principles of Community law.").
38 AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 3, art. 46(d) (amending TEU, art. L).
39 See id.
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up a double standard.40  Thus, it is not inconceivable that acts held to fall
outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights might
simultaneously be held outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ.41
D. Community Sources of Human Rights Protection
1. The Founding Treaties
Within the EC legal framework, the area of human rights is developed in
several different articles of the TEU (and the equivalent articles of the
Amsterdam Treaty), particularly article 8 (citizenship in the EU); article F
(respect for fundamental rights); article J. 1(2) (respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in foreign affairs and security policy); and article
K.2(1) (compliance with the HRFF in justice and home affairs). 2 In other
words, there is no "Bill of Rights" enumerating the fundamental freedoms
protected under the HRFF and the common constitutional traditions of the
member states. Because the standard of protection is so general and the scope
of rights embodied in the HRFF, drafted in 1950, is more limited than the
scope of economic and social rights currently protected within the EC and the
member states, there remains a certain amount of legal uncertainty in the area
40 See Bello et al., supra note 4, at 666.
4' An example of this is the holding of the European Commission of Human Rights (July
10, 1978) that a complaint was inadmissible under the requirements of the HRFF because the
acts of the EC Council could not be viewed as the acts of a member state. The ECJ had
previously held that the principles the applicant wished to rely on were not within the
jurisdiction of the ECJ. See Case 66/76, Confederation Frangaise D~mocratique du Travail v.
Council, 1977 E.C.R. 305, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 589 (1977); Wessman, supra note 32, at 7. Cf
Bello et al., supra note 4, at 666 (noting the differences between the positions of the ECJ and
the European Court of Human Rights on protection of business premises from arbitrary
interferences (citing Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, 2924)
and a business enterprise's right to silence (citing Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989
E.C.R. 3283)).
42 Under the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, explicit reference to the HRFF as a
standard has been removed. The ECJ is given partial judicial control over "framework
decisions" (art. 35(1), (6)) but is specifically denied any jurisdiction "to review the validity or
proportionality of operations carried out by police or other law enforcement services of a
member state or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon member states with regard
to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security" (art. 35(5)).
While actions of the EU qua EU are now explicitly held to the standard of the HRFF (art. 6(2)),
violations of fundamental rights fall within the jurisdiction of the ECJ (art. 46(d)), and actions
of member states can be reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights; there is clearly some
gray area between acts that are clearly those of the EU and those acts of member states. In those
gray areas lies a potential gap in protection for individual human rights.
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of human rights. The Amsterdam Treaty does not obviate the criticisms
directed at provisions for human rights in the Maastricht Treaty as being: 1)
scattered and diffuse; 2) not organized around a statement of social policy (as
economic policy is organized around the definition of the internal market in
article 7a); 3) in tension with economic motives; and 4) weak in normative
content.43 In the final analysis, the scope of the protection of fundamental
rights as prescribed in the treaties must be circumscribed not only by the
language of the treaties, but primarily by an understanding of the content
assigned to the HRFF by the case law of the ECJ.
The founding treaties of the EC eschewed political and social policy and
focused on economic integration. While the EEC Treaty did not specifically
confer fundamental human rights, the language of its preamble does evoke the
United Nations Charter in stating as objectives "the constant improvement of
living and working conditions" and the use of common resources to "preserve
and strengthen peace and liberty."" Furthermore, the EEC Treaty did protect
various individual rights, including freedom of movement and freedom from
discrimination on the basis of nationality and gender.45 In the absence of
protection of fundamental rights, however, the ECJ developed protections
based on general principles of EC law, the common constitutional traditions
of the member states, and international instruments, especially the HRFF.46
The preamble of the Single European Act (SEA) stressed the importance
of fundamental human rights in the process of transforming the EC into a
European Union, specifically aspiring to the standard set by the HRFF:
Determined to work together to promote democracy on the
basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitu-
tions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom,
41
equality and social justice...
The Maastricht Treaty went much farther in establishing a legal basis for
the protection of human rights. The TEU established citizenship of the EU
43 See Shaw, supra note 28, at 296-97.
44 Patrick M. Twomey, The European Union: Three Pillars without a Human Rights
Foundation, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 28, at 121-22.
45 See id. at 122 (citing EEC arts. 2,7,48,51,52,57,117-19, and 123 as conferring rights;
citing arts. 36, 48(3), 55, and 223-24 as exceptions and limitations).
46 See the discussion of the case law of the ECJ infra, Part III.D.2.
47 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1,2, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
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(article 8) and enumerated the rights attendant upon citizenship: the right to
move freely; the right of non-nationals to vote and stand for municipal office
in their state of residence under the same conditions as nationals; the right to
vote and stand for election to the European Parliament in one's state of
residence; the right to diplomatic or consular protection of citizens by the
authorities of any member state; and the right of every citizen to petition or
lodge a complaint with Parliament."9 These rights, provided in title II, fell
within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.4 9
While the citizenship rights conferred by the TEU significantly increased
protection of individual rights, they essentially represented an expansion of
rights already at the heart of economic integration (freedom of movement and
residence)" and stopped short of making real progress in social policy.5
Rather, general provisions on human rights were confined to articles not
subject to review by the ECJ. These included articles F(2), J. 1(2), and K.2(1),
which are aspirational provisions limited to the EU and not binding on member
states. All of this resulted in the irony that the member states aspired to a
common foreign policy based on concern for fundamental rights without being
bound, as a union, by similar obligations, compounded by a worrisome gap in
human rights protection in justice and home affairs.5 2
2. The Jurisprudence of the ECJ
In the face of such problematic gaps in the constitutional framework of EC
law, the ECJ, as with other issues not expressly addressed in written treaty law,
has developed a significant body of quasi-constitutional case law to give
substance to the EC's aspirations to respect fundamental rights. In doing so,
the court has used as its legal bases not only the scattered, express language of
4" EC TREATY, supra note 6, arts. 8(a)-(d); TEU, supra note 2, art. G(c).
49 See TEU, supra note 2, art, L(a).
50 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 124.
"I See Shaw, supra note 28, at 297. Cf Carlos Closa, Citizenship of the Union and
Nationality of Member States, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 28, at
109, 1II (commenting on the disassociation of citizenship from human rights as not following
the "constitutional model" and noting the widespread belief that the concept of EU citizenship
was the natural channel for incorporating human rights into the EC legal order).
2 See Erika Szyszczak, Social Rights as General Principles of Community Law, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 207, 215-16 (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds.,
1995) (arguing that where civil liberty is at stake there is the greatest need for enumerated and
binding rights enforceable by the ECJ); see also Twomey, supra note 44, at 123, 125 (discussing
the effect of the unqualified freedom of derogation and noting the absence of qualifications in
comparison with the provisions of the HRFF and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court).
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the treaties but also the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and
the common constitutional provisions of the member states, a sort of regional
customary international law. In the end, the court's holdings have attained
virtually the same ends as accession to the HRFF.
Before 1969, the ECJ did not consider application of fundamental rights
within its scope of review.53 However, beginning with the Stauder case, 4 the
role of the ECJ has evolved regarding its application of human rights law, from
reviewing measures adopted by community institutions55 to reviewing
measures taken by member states in implementing community measures5 6 and,
finally, to reviewing measures adopted by member states that fall more
generally within the scope of community law."
In Nold"8 the ECJ held that it could not uphold community measures
incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by national
constitutions. The court further held that international treaties for the
protection of human rights to which member states are parties can supply
guidelines to be followed within the framework of community law. In Rutili"9
the ECJ, for the first time, specifically referred to the HRFF and its ratification
by all the member states and held that the general principles enshrined in the
HRFF imposed limits on the extent to which member states could derogate
from the treaty on public policy grounds:
s E.g., Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority, 1959 E.C.R. 17 (refusing to recognize
fundamental rights as a basis for decision).
s Case 26/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, [1970] 10 C.M.L.R. 112.
s See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuthr- und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide und Futtermittel (The First 'Solange' Case), 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R.
255.
56 See Case 5/88, Wachaufv. Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, [19911 1
C.M.L.R. 328. See Nanette A. Neuwahl, The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward in
the Protection of Human Rights?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 52,
at 1,9-11.
57 See Neuwahl, supra note 56, at 11 (citing Case C-260/89, Elleniki Radiophonia
Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis (ERT), 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925).
" Case 4/73, Nold KG v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (asserting
that a claim of infringement by EC decision of property rights and free pursuit of business
guaranteed by German constitution). See generally Wessman, supra note 32, at 30-32 (outlining
the court's opinion in Nold).
'9 Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1221, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 140 (hearing a case in which an Italian trade union activist sought annulment of
residence permit barring entry into four French D6partements on public policy grounds); see
Wessman, supra note 32, at 32-34.
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* . . these limitations placed on the powers of Member
States in respect of control of aliens are a specific mani-
festation of the more specific general principle, enshrined
in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the... [HRFF],... ratified
by all the Member States, and in Article 2 of Protocol N.
4 of the same Convention, . . . which provides that no
restrictions shall be placed on the rights secured by the
above-quoted articles other than such as are necessary for
the protection of those interests in a democratic society.60
It should be noted, however, that the ECJ based its holding on its finding that
France had, in the first place, improperly invoked public policy grounds to
serve primarily economic ends.
In the ERTcase,6' the ECJ established an astounding breadth ofjurisdiction
over the application of fundamental rights. There, the court extended its
jurisdiction to the furthest point of community competence, namely, the ill-
defined boundary between community law and national interest. At issue in
the case was the Greek television broadcasting monopoly, which the Greek
government defended as a public policy derogation from article 66 (free
movement of services). The ECJ held that public policy justifications for
restrictions on freedom to provide services (as allowed in articles 56 and 66)
must be understood in light of the general principle of freedom of expression,
as embodied in article 10 of the HRFF. Thus, the ECJ has claimed jurisdiction
not only over measures taken by member states to implement community law
(as in Wachauj), but also over national measures taken in the exercise of the
discretionary powers of derogation granted by community law, which exercise
of discretion, importantly, is held to be within the scope of community action.
It is, however, possible to predict the limits to the ECJ's holding in ERTon
the basis of the court's decision in Grogan,62 a case decided earlier in the same
year. In Grogan the plaintiff sought a declaration from the Irish High Court
that various student publications that included information on United Kingdom
60 Rutili, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1232.
61 Case C-260/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925. See generally Neuwahl, supra note 56, at 10-11
(outlining the court's decision in ERT).
62 Case C- 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R.
1-4685, See generally Siofra O'Leary, Aspects ofthe Relationship Between Community Law and
National Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 23, 26-3 1
(summarizing the court's opinion in Grogan).
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abortion clinics were contrary to the Irish Constitution.63 The Irish judge
referred to the ECJ the questions whether the activities of the abortion clinics
constituted services within the meaning of article 60 of the EC Treaty and, if
so, whether the EC Treaty provisions on freedom to supply services precluded
a national rule prohibiting the provision of information regarding services
legally provided in other member states. After holding that abortion includes
a number of article 60 services, the ECJ held that the link between the
providers of information and the providers of the services was too tenuous to
support the argument that the Irish prohibition constituted a restriction of
services within the meaning of article 59 of the EC Treaty.
The ECJ left open the question of its jurisdiction in a case where a stronger
economic or contractual link were to exist. Indeed, the absence of an
economic link was crucial to the court's reasoning and may be the factor
distinguishing Grogan from ERT, where the Greek television monopoly had
clear economic motives and effects.'M
The issue in Grogan, pitting the fundamental community right of free
movement of services against an Irish national constitutional right protecting
the rights of the unborn, reflects the kind of conflict that most tests the
cohesion of the EU. It is, thus, not surprising that the ECJ did not squarely
address the issue of which moral framework should prevail, the EC's or one
deeply embedded in Irish culture.65 Until the EU attains a much higher degree
of political integration, it seems unlikely that the ECJ will abrogate member
states' prerogatives to derogate from treaty provisions on grounds of cultural
and security interests, even when such derogations are in conflict with the
general principles recognized by the court.
63 Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution provides: "The State acknowledges the right to
life of the unborn and ... guarantees in its laws to respect, and ... by its laws defend and
vindicate that right."
' Cf O'Leary, supra note 62, at 28-41 (arguing that holdings in Grogan and ERTtend in
the same direction, and that the ECJ has granted itself the power to strike down even national
constitutional provisions as incompatible with fundamental rights where there is a clearer
economic motive for derogation).
65 See Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685,4718-19 (characterizing the restriction of information
as compromising the freedom of a woman seeking an abortion to avail herself of services in
another member state, as well as arguing that such a restriction was justifiable under EC law as
a moral and philosophical judgement that Ireland was entitled to make).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Status Quo
In sum, the ECJ has extended its application of fundamental rights to
virtually all community action, and the Amsterdam Treaty has formally
acknowledged the jurisdiction of the court in this area. While significant as
the basis for the court to develop further its doctrine of rights protection, the
immediate result of the treaty amendment is the codification of the status quo.
It remains the fact that the fundamental rights case law of the ECJ, particularly
in the area of social rights, is not highly developed. Indeed, the bulk of the
court' sjurisprudence has been concerned with establishing itsjurisdiction over
fundamental rights. The changes wrought by the Amsterdam Treaty do not
obviate the criticism that "present case law ... gives no guidance as to what
rights are protected and what remedies exist for human rights violations." 66 In
light of the Amsterdam Treaty, the range of responses to the gaps in human
rights protections remains the same as it was following the ECJ's opinion on
accession:67 1) to maintain the status quo; 2) to amend the treaty to provide a
legal basis for accession; or 3) to amend the treaty to include a catalogue of
rights.
Consensus, reflected in the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, advocates
maintaining the status quo. Historically, the member states supporting this
course have included the dualist countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark), who objected generally to accession on the grounds that, as a result,
the HRFF would become part of the internal legal order of the member states. 6
Like other items on the agenda for expansion of community competence in
social and political spheres, both accession and a catalogue of rights were
perceived as a threat to national sovereignty.69 Furthermore, because the
fundamental rights found by the ECJ to be general principles of law are
derived from national constitutions and because all the member states have
ratified the HRFF, the argument is made that accession to the HRFF would not
provide any greater protection of rights than is currently provided under the
6 Tara C. Stever, Note, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Argument
for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919, 996 (1997) (arguing that the ECJ "selectively
distills" common practices from some member states and the reliance on common traditions
results in the adoption of the "lowest common denominator").
67 See Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
68 See Neuwahl, supra note 56, at 20-21.
69 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 125-26.
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jurisprudence of the ECJ.7° Supporters of the status quo also see no advantages
to the inclusion of a catalogue or "Bill of Rights" in the treaty. They argue
that the current approach of the court is more flexible and expansive and that
"even if agreement could be reached on which rights should be put into the
catalogue, the rights would become rigidly entrenched and possibly narrowly
interpreted."7'
The strongest argument against maintaining the status quo is that the case
law of the ECJ simply cannot provide the same degree of legal certainty as
could accession to the HRFF or the incorporation of a catalogue of rights in the
TEU.72 It is the case that acts within community competence have been
simultaneously held outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECJ.73 Furthermore, the recent decisions of
the ECJ in Grogan and ERT give rise to a fair amount of ambiguity as to how
broadly the court will define community action.
B. Accession to the HRFF
Prior to the court's opinion, accession was advocated as the preferred
means to increased protection of fundamental rights. The position has been
supported by widely varying rationales, foremost among them was the fact that
the HRFF, having been ratified by all the member states individually,
furnished a set of minimum or core standards already shared by all members.
This practical consideration has lost its force because the Amsterdam Treaty
incorporates the HRFF by reference.74 Proponents of accession argue that a
catalogue could not encompass all rights, might actually obscure other gaps,
and would pose a clear threat to national sovereignty.75 It has also been argued
that if such a catalogue could not go beyond the existing formulation of the
HRFF, which represents the consensus of the member states, it would be
superfluous.76 The most compelling argument for accession rests on the
71 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 71 st Report, 1979-
80, HL 362. See also the arguments of France, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom in Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, at V.3 (arguing that the ECJ has substantially
incorporated the HRFF into the EC legal order).
71 Closa, supra note 5 1, at 112.
72 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 125-26.
73 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
74 AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 3, art. 6(2).
71 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 125-26.
76 See Wessman, supra note 32, at 8. Contra Joseph H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and
Fundamental Boundaries, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 5 1,
73 (arguing that accession should not go beyond the core of the HRFF, thereby providing
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principle that human rights are better protected by courts constituted outside
the polity whose measures are to be reviewed.77 One scholar has argued that
the need for outside scrutiny will increase as the EC becomes increasingly
vested with powers once belonging to member states.78 Other advantages of
accession include: more uniform application of the HRFF within the EU;
79
easing the accession of eastern European states to the EU by supplementing
the constitutional rights of newborn democracies and, thus, minimizing
conflicts with states retaining vestiges of socialist legal traditions;80 and,
finally, enhancing the EC's image in the international court of opinion.8'
What likely made accession to the HRFF the more popular route to
increased protection of human rights was the now untenable assumption that
it did not require amendment of the TEU. Even before the court's opinion,
however, the obstacles to accession were formidable. In the first place,
accession would have required amendment of the HRFF and its protocols
because they are open only to the member states of the Council of Europe,
which the EC did not propose to join. 2 In addition, to address the problem of
the derogations granted to and reservations made by the EC member states as
contracting parties to the HRFF, the EC would presumably have had to limit
its adherence to the HRFF to only those provisions ratified by the member
states.8 3 Most problematic are the ramifications of accession on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ECJ under articles 164 and 219 of the EC Treaty. Unless
the EC could negotiate a special agreement to exclude disputes between
member states and the EC, the European Court of Human Rights would
become involved in the interpretation and application of community law and
thus undermine the autonomy of community legal order.84 Judging from the
outcome of the negotiations culminating in the Amsterdam Treaty, there is
maximum protection to national sovereignty).
" See Weiler, supra note 76, at 74.
78 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 125-26.
79 See id. at 127.
80 See id. Arguably, amendments of the Amsterdam Treaty render this advantage of
accession superfluous because accession to the EU is predicated on "respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States." AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 3, art. 49 (referring to art. 6(1)). The power of the
council, in conjunction with Parliament, to suspend treaty rights of member states found to be
in violation of article 6(1) principles would also act as a remedy.
8' See Neuwahl, supra note 56, at 20.
82 See Bello et al., supra note 4, at 664.
83 See Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 1764.'
84 See id. at I.I0, VI. 1, 2.
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clearly a great deal of resistance to yielding any of the jurisdiction of the ECJ
to the European Court of Human Rights.
C. Enumerated Rights
Because further development of human rights law within the EC necessar-
ily requires amendment of the TEU, the creation of a catalogue of rights may
well prove the more attractive and practical alternative. The European
Parliament has been a longtime advocate of enumerated rights.85 While the
proponents of accession prefer the flexibility inherent in the approach of the
ECJ, the advocates of a "Bill of Rights" cite the benefits of legal certainty.86
Another argument for enumerated rights is that a catalogue would provide a
framework for further discussion and development rather than freezing the
process or obscuring gaps in protection.87 Indeed, the creation of a EU "Bill
of Rights" would provide an opportunity to update the scope of fundamental
rights as they are embodied in the HRFF, drafted in 1950, to reflect the
concerns of contemporary European social welfare with its highly developed
protections of economic and social rights.8
The most cogent argument for a catalogue of rights has been made by
Judge Koen Lenaerts, who stresses the necessity of maintaining two distinct
legal orders, the EC and the HRFF. 9 His rationale for this position is twofold:
1) the authority of the HRFF is to be maintained in the field of the residual
powers of the EC member states; and 2) simultaneously "federalism" is to be
avoided by vesting some autonomy in the EC member states.90 Judge Lenaerts
proposes a catalogue that puts the HRFF at the core of expanding concentric
rings of community-protected human rights, comprised of general principles
of law, fundamental rights of the community system, and aspirational rights. 9'
Judge Lenaerts advocates a relationship between the ECJ and the European
" See European Parliament, Resolution of April 12, 1989, adopting the Declaration of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51 (1989) (enumerating rights related to
occupation, working conditions, collective action, social welfare, education, abolition of the
death penalty, as well as traditional civil and political rights); see also Twomey, supra note 44,
at 126.
86 See Twomey, supra note 44, at 126.
"i See id. (noting that a treaty framework would promote discussion and engender a
"culture of rights").
" See Neuwahl, supra note 56, at 20.
'9 Koen Lenaerts, Fundamental Rights to be Included in a Community Catalogue, 16 EUR.
L. REV. 367, 367 (1991).
90 See id. at 374-75.
9' Id. at 367.
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Court of Human Rights analogous to that between the national courts of the
EC member states and the ECJ. He also proposes an amendment to the HRFF
to enable the ECJ to request rulings from the European Court of Human Rights
on interpretation of HRFF provisions on the model of an EC member state's
request for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.
9 2
Thus a catalogue of rights, even if it adopts the standards of the HRFF,
could, theoretically, promote uniformity without infringing too much either on
the jurisdiction of the ECJ or the sovereignty of the member states. It is
perhaps more realistic to expect that the codification of a "Bill of Rights"
would engender as much concern, especially on the part of the dualist states,
for national sovereignty as would accession to the HRFF.93 Aside from the
time needed to negotiate the contents of such a catalogue, a further significant
drawback of this approach is that the preliminary reference procedure would
not enable individuals to compel the ECJ to submit their cases to the European
Court of Human Rights.
94
V. CONCLUSION
EC accession to the HRFF was once advocated as the better route to
expanded protection of fundamental rights. Although the position has been
supported by widely varying rationales, its primary attraction lay in the fact
that the HRFF, by virtue of having been ratified by all the EC member states
individually, embodied the consensus of the members. Now that the ECJ has
held that there is no community competence to accede to the HRFF, momen-
tum has shifted from that direction.
Instead, the consensus reached in the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty
reflects resistance to amending the treaty to enable either accession or the
incorporation of a catalogue of rights. By bringing fundamental rights
violations formally within the jurisdiction of the ECJ and vesting enforcement
and screening powers in the council, the drafters have manifested an intent to
expand community competence and the court's jurisdiction rather than yield
to the external judicial control of the European Court of Human Rights.
Indeed, the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, if anything, make it even
more difficult for the EU to accede to the HRFF.
92 See id.
9' Cf. Stever, supra note 66, at 994-95.
94 Bello et al., supra note 4, at 668 (also noting that individuals are entitled to submit
complaints regarding member states' action under the HRFF system).
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Simultaneously, it is apparent that gaps remain in the protection of
individual human rights within the EU. As things stand, individuals lack direct
access to the ECJ in the event of fundamental rights violations by community
institutions. Furthermore, the case law of the ECJ is underdeveloped in the
area of social rights and provides little legal certainty as to what rights are
protected and what remedies exist for violations. As the EU becomes ever
closer and the EC acquires more competence over social and political matters,
less guidance will be available, given that the court's jurisprudence has
heretofore been focused on economic union. Expanding the scope of human
rights protection on a case by case basis will undoubtedly prove too slow to
keep pace with the changing nature of the EU.
In the end, creation of a catalogue of rights by amendment to the treaty may
prove a more practical and desirable alternative. The "Bill of Rights"
approach is most likely to offend the guardians of national sovereignty. The
trend, however, is the expansion of community competence at the expense of
national sovereignty. The drafters of such a catalogue have the opportunity to
expand on the rights protected by the HRFF to reflect advances made since
1950. More importantly, a catalogue of rights, even one that puts the standards
of the HRFF at its core, can promote uniformity without infringing too much
on the jurisdiction of the ECJ or the national sovereignty of the member states.
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